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IN THE 
Supreme Court 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
K11~NN1~CO'l"l' COPPf<JB C'OHPOHf,_ 
'l'ION, a corporation, and BING-
HAM AND GAHF lELD HAIL-
WAY COMPANY, a corporation, 
Pla.imtiffs, 
vs. 
S'l'A'l'E 'I'AX COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7298 
'l'he parties hereto have cooperated below in endea-
voring to shape an inherent'ly complicated tax record 
in such manner that there could be presented concisely 
for the determination of this court six questions of prin-
C'iplc. The mathematical results to follow when these 
prineiples are determined may then be worked out with-
1 
out, it is expected, suhjpding the court to such details. 
Therefore the fact::; herein are stipulated in an "Agreed 
Heeonl'' (H. 101-113) amplified by a brief formal hear-
ing before the Connni::;sion. (R. 39-100.) 
A. As To The Part~,es 
1. Tlw Cmnmis::;ion is a body politic created and 
existing in a<'eordanee \i·ith the Constitution of the State 
ot' Utah and authorized hy law to adlllinister Chapter 
t:: of Title 80 of the lTtah Code, known as the Corpora-
lion [<'ntn<'hiRP 'l'::x Act. 
:2 (a). K cnnceott Cop per ( 'orpora tion i::; a corpora-
tion ~1r the ~tate of New York duly qua'lified to do and 
doing husirwss thE~re as well as in Utah and other states. 
It oWIJ:·\ and operates the well-known Utah Copper }line 
in ~alt Lake Connt~·, State of Utah. It::; ores from this 
1nine are tlten transported to its mills at Magna and 
Artlinr. This transportation at the time here involve<1 
wac; <;\'<T tlH: t c·aeks of the Bingham and Garfield Hailway 
(',,mpnn::, \\·Li<'il is a who!!.\· owned snhsi<liar~·. (Tlte 
lTb;i ('orporaiion i1'nmchic;e Tax· rctnrns of that <'<llll· 
jL•n>· n! (' <'onsolidated with Kennecott's and for <~ll :u:·-
[l<,se~-; h('t·<~in this transportation operation will be in-
eluded as part of the l'lah Copper Division operatious 
of K <~nne<·o tt.) 
(b). The mill eorH•tmtrates of Kennecott are smelted 
at Uarfield and other smelters in Utuh and elsewhere 
mHler eont ract arrang-ements with the American Smelting 
and l~E.~t"ining Cmnpan.v and other smelting companies. 
mi:-del' ('Opper, t)w [li'Odud of the smelting, is then trans-
2 
porll'd )J) l\ l'llliP<~oL t!J rough tl1e serviee of nninut' <'<Jlll-
liWll c·anier~ to refineries, all of whicl1 arc uut~ide of 
the Ntate of' Utah. Kennecott has no interest in any of 
t!Jp;-;p conJitton carriers or 111 an~· of the smeltin:·;· :li'd 
refining <'Olllpanies. 
( c·). 'l'hc' re!'ined produet i~ then r-wld for Kenne-
<·ott ·~ n<'eount by Kennecott Nales Corporation, which is 
a wlwll)· owned snhsidian· and which receives an agreed 
<·onnni ssion l'o r snr h sPrviee~. Part of Kennecott's cop-
pc·r prec·ipitates is neither smelted nor refined, but is 
sold h~· Kenneeott a;;; produ(•ed. (At all time;-; until sale, 
tll<' ores from the Utal1 Copper l\l inp remain Kennecott's 
de~ pi te changes due to milling, .smelting aud refining.) 
(d). !n tlle course of Kennecott'~; operations it en-
gages the service of and pay:,; a substantial number of 
t>lllJlloyees in Utah and in the other states in which it is 
engaged in business. Kennecott purchases great quanti-
tie~ of equipment, materials and supplies boU1 within and 
outside the State of Utah for necessary use and con-
sumption in the course of its operations. (R. 101-3; Stip. 
par. I.) 
B. As To The Deficiency Assessment·. 
1. Kennecott and the Commission were once before 
engaged in controversy with respect to the two main 
is:snes here, namely, the method of al'locating a proper 
proportion of Kennecott's income to the State of Utah, 
and the method of computing the deduction to be allowed 
for depletion of its mining properties under the Corpora-
ti(lll Franchise rrax Act. 'l'he taxable years involved were 
s 
1935 to 1941 inclusive. \Vhile this controversy was pend-
ing in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, Case No. 
6324, a mutually satisfactory settlement was agreed upon 
and by stipulation the proceedings were dismissed under 
date of 1fay 27, 1942. 
2. Under the terms of tl1is settlement certain prin-
ciples for computing Kennecott's franchise tax 'liability 
were mutually agreed upon and applied to each of the 
years 1!)35 to 1941 inclusive. 'l'he corporation t'ranchic;e 
tax returns filed by Kennecott for the calendar years 
1942, 1943 and 1944 were likewise prepared and filed in 
exact conformance with such principles; and in accor-
dance therewith the tax was computed, levied and paid 
for each such year and for the taxable year 19+2 in the 
sum of $17 4, 100.54. 
:3. N ohvi lhstanding the foregoing settlement and 
the further faet that there were no changes in the per-
sonnel of the Commission, by letter dated March 10, 194;) 
the Commis;;:ion proposed adjustmentR in the tax and 
as;-;essed a deficiency or additiona'l tax for the year 19:t2 
in the sum of $2:l2,722.66. Kcmneeotl nhjeeted to sail1 
deficiency b~· petition for n~determination timely filed, 
elaiming- a rPfund of the tax paid. ( IL 10:1-·1; Stip. par. 
II.) 
C. Kennecott's Two Requests 
Among other matters, the .May, 1942 agreement in-
volved the following: 
(a). 'J'he taxpayer was to file, not for its entire 
operations, but on the basis of its Utah Copper Division 
4 
incollJC alone; and ii. \vas to allocate to Utah a proportion 
of tltat income on the bm;is of certain variable ~nt a;rrced 
factors. ('I'. 109-10; ,stip. par. IV.) 
(h). ln computing the allowance for depletion, kJ-
eral taxe~' were not first deducted. (T. 108-9; Stip. par. 
III (B).) 
(e). l•'in:xlly, in computing the depletion allowance, 
all Utah ?dines Division net income. resulting from pro-
duction of ltletals was treated as "net income from the 
property." (R 105-8; Stip. par. III (A).) 
(Parenthetically it may here be: noted that the princi-
ples under thi~; agreement were a logical and reasonable 
development of the transition of the old Utah Copper 
( ~ompany into the Kennecott Copper Corporation with 
its JWUJifold operations in addition to those in Utah. 
Kennecott does not contend that the agreement was 'leg-
all~· hinding on the Commission as to the returns sub-
sequent to 1941.) 
Subsequently the Commission chose, by its deficiency 
a:o;sessrnent made herein, to depart from the principles 
of the May lD42 agreement; whereupon Kennecott in 
turn, in connection with its petition for redetermination 
and the hearing thereon, contended that it, too, had such 
a ripld and made the following two requests or conten-
tions: 
Fin,t: That Utah's statutes reqmre m the absence 
of agreement or a determination under subsection 8 of 
Section 80-1i3-21, that the ,tax be based upon a return re-
porting the corporation's over-all operations, and then 
5 
invoking the statutory allocation formula to determine 
the taxable Utah income. ( R. 110; Stip. par. IV (3).) 
Sinc·e agreement seemed no longer possihle in view of 
the Connni:st,ion 's rhange of attitude, on January 19, 
1948 Kennecott filed its Amended Return on the corpor-
ate basi:s a:,; required h~' Section 80-1:3-21 (1-7). (R. 110, 
228-:14.) 
Second: '!'hat it be Jlermitted to change to the Ctah 
("osL-or-value method of determining depletion (Secti(m 
S0-1:l-:) (a) ), or in the a!tPrnative preferably to the fe<l-
t•ral percentage metlwd, sincc~ the state perct~ntage l!W-
thod as then inte1·pr<-·ted and applied hy the l'onnuis.c;;ion 
resnlted in a denial oL the requirecl reasonable allowanc-e 
for depletion. (H. 10i'J; Stip. )Jal'. lH.) 'J1he reasons 
given for this n~qtwst were detailed in the te:stimony at 
the l'o rnm! llc~~u i ng and will be :smmna rized hereafter in 
t'(Jmwc•i ion with the argumPnt on this point. 
i-(ennec·ott ali-in raised other points now moot because 
<"<iiH'<'dl~d ll:> tl1e t 'omll!i~;sion, atta(~ked the l<'ranchise Ad 
a.< tlH' ( 'onunis~;ion would !Jere appl;. it a~ unC"on~titn-­
timwL and objected to the irwlii~ion of federal subsidies 
<H gr.l:-:i' inemne. (H. 1 :H-147.) 
D. The Commission's Decision 
The Commi:ssion ':s deci~ion i:s silent with respect to 
some of' these matters, hut it i~ not in di~pute that hy its 
de(•ision and the aecommpanying schedules (R 16-i36): 
Virst: 'l'h0 agreement of :.1 ay, 1 ~!42 1i''as still invoked 
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to tile c:xt('J;t that tllc' tax was still computed on tile ngn'<'-
lllent lmsis, and not on tl1e basis of Kennecott's a111ended 
return <'O\'ering it~: tmtire operations and then allocatirli.!," 
inemnp to F t a h. 
8ecm1d: rl'l!e agreement of May, ]942 was not fol-. 
!mad in at least three respects: 
(a). c\n allocation of total lllC'OllW to ''mining" 
has no\1· he(m lllade by a ConnniHHion-devised se'lf-proving 
formula, t lllls eliminating such exeluded part of the total 
ineome l'rom the property in computing depletion. (Ex. 
-L r~. 221i.) 
(h). In eomputing depletion federal taxes have now 
fir:-( ]Jppn dedneted. 
(e). While tn;ating the Utah Copper Divit-Jion as a 
sepamt(' tax unit for some purposes, the Commission on 
tl1e other hand now Ut-Jes Kenneeott't-J entire operations 
in other respects, sueh as f o1· the allocation of federal 
taxes to Utah. 
Third: 1'he position of the plaintiff that if the Com-
mission were to depart from the May, 1942 agreement, 
Kennec•ott, too, would be freed therefrom, and its two 
requests ahove outlined would therefore be proper, was 
completely ignored. 
E. Payment and Review 
\rithin the time allowed by law 'plaintiff deposited 
with tl1e dcf(mdant the amount found by it to be due, and 
applied for and obtained from this court the statutory 
Wi"it of review. (R. 3-14.) 
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H. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The Tax Commission erred in refusing to follow 
the Utah Corporation Franchise 'rax Act ( ~80-13-21) 
which in the case of a taxpayer doing business in several 
states requires that the tax shall be based urwn a retnrn 
including the company's operations in those states and 
then allocating to Utah its proportion of that total income 
in accordance with the statutory formula. 
2. rr,he State 'rax Commission erred in that it has 
fai'led to allow the taxpayer the required reasonable 
allowance for depletion. 
:3. The Commisl-iion has misinterpreted tlw Utal1 
statutes establishing the percentage formula for deter-
mining depletion. 
4. 'rhe 'rax Commission erred in that it has dis-
criminated against this taxpayer and is attempting to 
take its property without due proee~;s or law in violation 
of the l:<'ourieenth Amendnwnt of thP F'cderal Con::;titu-
tion, and Sections 7 and 24, .\rticle I, of the Constitutimt 
of the State of Utah. 
5. The Tax Commission erred in including in the 
tax base subsidies paid to plaintiff by the Federal Gov-
ernment. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Tax Commission 'erred in refusing to follow the 
Utah Corporation Franchise Tax Act (§80-13-21) which 
8 
in the ca~;e of a t=a:-::1;:ay~;y d~:::r~~; busiaess ~n se·v~ ~·£;,1 bt-:~rs 
rev; L~rcs that the tax shaH he based upon a retu1 n h:::h~~:;r:g 
the eomp;1ny's opN·;O:i>c)US in thm;c sbies and then. :J1.•<:::ll~ng 
tn Utah its propnrtion of that' total income in acwrclance 
with the sbh;tory formuh. 
't'ili~ qm~s\ion il' tliP familiar one ol' how a fn)r pro-
por1i<•ll ol' the income o[ the multi-~tate cOl'poration shall 
}Je as:-:i.::~nc~d or allocated l'or tux purposes to any particu-
lar state. 1~tali !tas met th<~ qne~tion with the statutory 
mandate ol' '0 80-1:1-21 \vhich requires reporting of the 
taxpu~·er 's total ineome, and then after segregating and 
providing for the tn~dmcnt of rents, intere1-lt, dividen1ls 
and eapital gains, provides: 
(G) lf the bank or other corporation carries 
on any business outside this state, the said re-
mainder may be divided into three equal parts: 
(a) Of one third, such portion shall be at-
tributed to business carried on with this state as 
8hall he found hy multiplying said third by a 
fraction whose numerator is the value of the cor-
poration's tangible property situated within this 
state and whose denominator is the value of all 
the corporation's tangible property wherever 
situated. 
(b) Of another third, such portion shall be 
attributed to business carried on within this state 
as shall be found by multiplying said third hy a 
fraction whose numerator is the total amount 
expended by the corporation for wages, salaries, 
commissions or other compensation to its employ-
ees and assignable to this state and whose de-
nominator is the total expenditures of the cor-
poration for wages, salaries, commissions or other 
compensation to all of its employees. 
(c) Of the remammg third, such portion 
:shall be attributed to business carried on within 
this state as shall be found by multiplying said 
third 'by a fraction whose numerator is the amount 
of the corporation's gross receipts from business 
assignable to this state, and whose denominator 
is the amount of the corporation's gross receipts 
from all its busine::;s. 
(S) If in il1e jndglllent ol' the tax commis-
sion the applieation of the foregoing rules does 
not alloeate to thi::; ::;tate the proportion of net 
ineome f'aidy and eqnitahly attrihutable to this 
:-:tate, it may with sueh information as it may be 
able to obtain make sueh alloration as is fair]~· 
<·alenlatPd to assign to tl1is state the portion of 
nut income rcasonaJ.~Jy ath·ibutahle to the business 
donp within !hi~; state and to avoid subjecting 
tit(' taxJm~·rr to douhl<~ taxation . 
. \s lwretofon: noted, the taxpa,w:r and the Com-
lni:-:: i1•n tlmnr;..:;ll 1 ~J41 hy agT<~CJncnt lmd invoked an alter-
rw! l\1' U1u1 IJnd tot h~: ~;'rand:n·d thn•(:-vart ":\fassael111setts 
for•n:lla." Xo\\·, e~m tl1e ( 'onJJ'lissioJ~ c·x-part(~ vlmng·e 
t}'O:'!' .·o·:·evd principl(•s and wit1Jont i'nrthn a<lo snhst!-
tutP it:; <)\l·n nPW alloeation llldlJod; or is not sueli adion 
arhitrar.', <'aprieious and eontrary to law unless aml until 
:-:uh::;edion ( R) is proper]~· invoke<l1 
'I'll<· C'olllmission on<'e befon~ tried jni'it this, and in 
1 !J:~!l ,,·as tul<l hy this eourt that the legislature intended 
the ( 'onlJllission to depart from the formula only when-
ever the application if its provisions does not allocate to 
the slate the hnsinc::;::; fairly attrihutahle to it. California 
lO 
Paekinp· ( 'o;·porati1;n Y. ~tate Tax Commi~:'"iou, 0/ Utah 
3G7, !J:l P. 2d 4Gi3. 
Antplil":~ing- this :-;tatc'ment, .J u:.;tice:-; \roll"e and ::\le-
Donoug-h noted: 
"' ~· In determining· the ''portion of net 
ineollle as:-:ignable to bnsines::; dolle u;ithin tl!is 
state" the connni:-:sion "may" use the rules set 
out in tlle main opinion. rl'his does not mean that 
the Cormnission ma~· ignore the rules and choose 
it:-: own. "::\lay" has the meaning of "should," 
i.e., should follow the rules unless the rules fail 
to accomplish the overarching purpose as revealed 
by subsection (H). It is only in case an appli-
eation of the rule;.; a;.; laid down fails to ''allocate 
to this ::;tate the proportion of net income fairly 
and equitably attributable to this state" (sub-
:-;pc·iion S), or, on tlw otlter hand, \\'h<~re the ru]ps 
would snhjc~ct the taxpayer to so-called double 
taxation that the Commission may depart from 
them. 1'his eonclusion is fortified by {he fact 
that the word "may" is used, together with the 
fact that the entire purpose of the rule is to arrive 
at a figure "fairly calculated to assign to this 
state the portion of the net income reasonab1ly 
attributable to the business done within the state 
and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double 
taxation." ~· * * (p. 380) 
Also: 
* * * If a corporation had much property 
here as compared to its total property, but did 
little business here, it would on the first third 
of its total net income from sales, under suh-
Rertion (G) (a), pay a di:;;proportionate tax, but 
thi:-; might he compensated for under subsection 
(G) (c), depending on how subsection (G) (e) ( lst) 
is interpretecl. lJsualJ~~ the proportions of its 
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total \Vages and salaries attributable to Utah, cal-
eulated under subsection (G) (b), related to the 
tota'l wages and salaries pai<l everywhere would 
represent a fair proportion of net income alloeable 
to Utah, compared to total net income from all 
sales. All<l frequently the inequities which might 
ensue ;'rom the use of jm.;t one of the i'ractiom; 
dPfined b~· snhsl:dion (())(a), ~h) and (e), \\'(Jnld 
he compensatPd hy the use of the tltn;e fra<·tions 
r:L1elt hased on a third of the total nd income 
(c~xeludinp: that. sPt out in suh:,ections (:))awl(-!-). 
[>,ut herP and therp by tlw nsp of all these frac-
tions a marh:d inequit~· might still remain either 
ag·ainst tl!P state or against tlw taxpayer, in whieh 
eac't' sullseetion ( t\) eont<;:.; inlo play. ( p. :lf·n.) 
I a tlmt eas<: in applying the law the eourt ]lc'ld t!wt 
the tn:q';;Y('I' \\ ;)s "~lw nsual an<l ordinar~· manufacturing 
conqmn~· all!l there is shown no n:mwn for departing 
fl'()Jll th(· n;;~·ula:· Jt!etliO<l of computation to delennine 
tli<: nmo::Ht of i ls f'mnchise tax." So, here, the tm.:pn:·;er 
i~ the usual anr1 ordinary mining company; it has prop-
el·: .. -::, l 1 tnli nJHl (•'H'\\-llen•; ha~; enlp1n;·ces l!Qrc and else-
'· 
1 :~'1'<· ·and 1uake.'-' sal\'s he:·e anrl ebe\':lten:. 
'::<' n'l'ord i~ silent m; to wlt~1 tl1e Crn;nnis:-;ion L:·-
Jw:nrL £·._. nneeott's relllrn, \\'liielt after tl1is eonh·oy('t''.\. 
aro~H,: \YH::-> bused upon the statntory formula. It is ap-
parPut tlmt the formula gives a less favorable result in 
total tax dollars due insofar as the State of Utah is con-
cerned; hut this court in ih; opinions has nPver sanctioned 
this end as justification for departure from legislative 
mandate. We would venture that the indivi<lual members 
of tlw Commission have never even looked at JjJxhibit 
1 (R. 219-22:1), which was explained by the witness Par-
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ConJmis;oion's eonn;,(~l fluffed of( the maUer hy sng·g-t~stiitg' 
that l<:J•nnecott h<d 110! l'irst olJbinc·d "rwr;nission tn 
chang<•"; an'1 ~I r. Parsom; admitted that h(~ ImP\\' oi' no 
such request (IL ;);)) Hmvever, to ihe extent tmeh n re-
quest ,,·as neee;~;oar)- (we believe i1 not) (•otmsel Cor plnin-
tiff tJ1en made it clear that Kemweoit did so ;:;ulnnit smll 
<l reqnc~;t to ihe Commission. (H. i"'J:l) Furthemwrp this 
fad was apparent to any wlto had bothered to read Ken-
necott's lettt>r of ,Janu:u)·1~l, l!l+8 which <weompanied the 
filing \Vitlt tlte Cmmni~;sion of the amended return based 
np{Jn 11H• :.;tatutor~- formula. (Aw~mente<l Heeord, IJJl. 
"')8_')4• ) L...... d 0 
But without further ado tlte statute and return pur-
suant tll(~rdo were ignored by the Commission, whieh 
appnrentl:- by its decision in the main merely rubber-
stamped tJJC ingenious staff attempts designed to gain 
more revenue. In doing this tlJe Commission acted re-
gardless of the fact that the staff report disregarded 
prior commitments by the Commi~sion, its own admini-
strative pradice over the years, and the statutes of the 
State of Utah as con~trued by this court. 
2. The Stat,e Tax Commission erred in that it has 
failed to aHow the taxpayer the required reasonable allow-
ance for depletion. 
a. Legislative History of Depletion. 
An elementary principle peculiar to operations such 
as mining- i~ that ore in place is a wasting asset. Like 
money in the bank, there is only so much; and when with-
drawn pro tanto it is gone. Hence returns from mining 
13 
arc ·'income'' only to the extent that excluded from the 
gross is a proper allowance for depletion, and hence 
under both state and federal statutes hased upon income 
there is afforded a de<luction for depletion. 27 Am .. Tur., 
"Income Taxes,'' H 122-12fl. 
In x~~w !'ark ~lining Company, ct al \'. State 11ax 
Commission, 1!Hi P. 2d -tH;\ this court said: 
.. ':~ * _ .. _ ~rhe theory npnn \vhich \Vasting n~sPts 
corporations, t-meh as mining companies, are 
allowe<l a dedudion fo1· depletion, is that the cor-
poration franchise tax is a tax on income or upon 
the inne11wnt produeed b)' eapital, and not upon 
the eapital itself. lienee, wasting assets (~orpor­
ations are allowed a deduction for depletion on 
the thc>or)' tltat the taxpayer thus re(~oups its 
capital investlllent. ·• '' *'' 
TIH• statutory wording requires the dedudion of "a 
reasonable allowanee I' or depletion * ~,,, according to the 
peculiar nJ11rlitio11.~ in eru·h case; sneh reasonable allow-
nm·e in all east'S to he lltadc> tmdPr rrdvs and regulations 
to he pn·serihPd b;-. til(~ tax <'OIIllllission." (; ,'\0-1:~-8(8), 
lltal; (~ode ,\nnotated nJ+:q 
(! 'anmthetieall;>, ii shonld here be noh•d 1lmt t!H~ 
Cottunis~;i()ll <'on(pnd~ in <~f'fc>et that these words in the 
lllain an~ l'teaninglt~~s, sin('e the taxpayer ran utiliz-;e hut 
two po:':'illl<" n1dhods of dPp!etion eonqmtation.) 
This prineiplc being elear, its administration be-
eouJes ('Oillplieated only in the determination of what iR 
the proper base !'or depletion ''in each ease." If exces-
sive, tl1c operatC>r will not 1>(~ pa;-.·ing his fnll income tax; 
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it' def'ieient, tlte taxing authority will be attempting im-
properl~ to <·oll<>d taxes based other than on income. Jt 
..-ltould he noted tlmt in eontra:-:t with the li'edcml Oovern-
ment. the ~ialf' Tax (~om mission ha::; made no genPral 
rule:-; and regulation:-: eovering· depletion. (H. 10-~) 
At fi n;l ( 'o11gre:-;:-: <'Rtahli:-;lted aR the base for com-
puting c!<·pl<~tion tlw valu<• of' the particular mine (or its 
eo:-:t when· that ex(•eeded value) a:-; of the effective date 
of the in<'Olll<' tax law:-;, or it:-; cost (today discovery value) 
at tl1e tilll<' ol' aequi:-;ition if :-;nch occnred subsequent 
the1·do. This 111ethod wa:-; Likewise adopted b~' the Utah 
Legif'.latun· in 19:l1 ( ~ g()_J :~-8 U)a) ), ancl is still the 
metl10d presnihed 'h_,. hoth state and federa'l governments 
for dctennining e.apital lose:-; or v,aim; in the event of sale 
of the 1nining property. (§§ 80-1:1-8 (9a), 80-13-14; \Vit-
IWS:-: l<:arJ, H. :J!J-(j(), 71-2.) 
Bni mining vPntures are both speeulative and their 
,-alne i:-; often extremely diffienlt to determine as of any 
gi,·en date such as .Januar_,. 1, 1931. (R. 218) So Con-
gress, after extensive studies of the problem, devised an 
alternative second mc~thod-15% of the gross proceeds, 
but not to exceed 50% of the net; and presently the tax-
payeJ· i:-; permitted to make a choice each year of either 
method. (R. 73-4) This percentage method is not just an 
arbitrary allowance, hut was adopted by Congress as 
fair to both the Government and the taxpayer. Based 
upon extensive studies and hearings, the precise 'percent-
age adopted was directly related to typical actua'lly ascer-
tained values. (R. 7:"l-4) 'rhese studies indicated that the 
llJetnl mining industry received in depletion allowances 
baO'ed upon cost-or-value an average deduction equiva-
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kn:_ io about 17/6 of their gro.;s ~;ales, reported the .Joint 
Congressional Committee on lnternal Hevenue 'l'axation, 
p. CS, \'ol. 1, !'art N, sulnnitted to Congre::;s ~eptemher 
lD, 1!12!!. 'J'hc ( 'mmuittee therefore recommended: 
''l''!'om the study of thi::; whjed it is believed 
tltat 1:> per eent of the gross sales value with a 
:SO per cent limitation to net income, ·,nmld he a 
reasonable rate to allow tht~ metal-mining· industry 
l'or the future. Thi:-; redudion h;· 2 ]!C'r ec•nt oL 
the aetual ligure:-; shown in ihe ::;mimuu·y i::; 
Uwught advi::;:1hle to off:-;et the continuing e:fe(·t 
oi' t ltc~ ]'l'lt'C1Jta.~:e dPpletion mPthod. 
·' i'ile J :·> rwr cent depiution allowance 011 
gros::; sales is equivalent to a thcoretiral deduc-
tion of :;o per eent on net inem11e. In a(:( ual 
operations tite ;)() per ecnt on net may \nr;: 1:) 
per cent above or lwlow tl1is Jigure, <lep(mding on 
tile pro lite; mwlc~ h:· the pal'ti('ular op<>ration." 
"\s tlw Unitecl ;··)tate::; \\·u:~ amending- it:-; law:-; to ean;' 
into el'fed the~e eollttnittee reeomntelHlation:-;, Utah in 
1!l:l1 ·,,.·a;-; n,[,~p!inr; it~~ c>wn ,;fdP t'o:·;10ration franc·hisc 
h:.: a:·; tli<~ J'P>'nl: oi' the l'rol'c•:-;:-;or Lul;;; tax studies Ender 
tl nem a<1mini:-c1nltion .. \ pL~n·Emtugc 1:wtliod \\·as like-
\\ i~• i1wlwled a:-; an nltema:i ;;e to value b;· ·) 80-1:)-3 (9) 
( i;), :;.d 1\'a:' :-;ct. at :;:l 1-:l pc:r Ct~nt or the "net income 
from tile propert~· H·x· eomputed without allowanec for 
dPpletion." .\l'ter onee making an eleetion of method, 
lww<'V<'r, t!u~ taxpa)·cr t•annot :-mhseqnently change \vith-
out III<> Tax Conllnission';-; eonsent. 
b. History in Kennecott's Case. 
Kennecott (we inelnde its precleccsso r-) in 19:n made 
the election required hy the new Utah :,;tatute. It accepted 
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the percentage method which it has consi::otently followed 
until the instant eontrover::oy. (H. 10-1-) When in 19:-~2 
Kennecott, m; well as other Ufah mines, elected to invoke 
the state percentage method, it is important to note that 
tl1e Tax Conunis::oion ';: initial return forms permitted, 
aHd t]IOSl~ eonec~rned invariably int(~rpreted the ::tatnte 
to pmvide ror: ( 1) no ul!oeation of income frulll tlte 
lllining- proj;t•r:.\ to · "mi11in;;·''; an<l (2), no prjor dechlc-
tion oi' l'c~dcml taxes. (H. 10G, G2). J(enm'(:ott, us well 
as oJlic•rs, filed it::; returns on tl1is l1:1s1s and tliP~'e n~i1i<'ilS 
''''i''~ ;weeptc~d h;- ihc C'ommi~·:sion from 1!1:31 and fnr 
J!Wil.'' .ve:1rs sl!llseqtwnt thereto. (H. 1 OR) 
In I ~1-J:l, lt()wevc~r, ·wliEm the fedora! ta;; had 1weome 
a llll>st ;-;n)Jshmtiul factor, the Commission reviewed its 
pradiee; detc"nninod tlmt the ienut-; ol' the t-;tatntc•s n~­
qnir<>d l'edernl taxes 1o he first cleduetcd bcfon~ COlllpnl-
int.:: depldion if the perc-entage mntho(l were to be in-
YIJked: aill(~ude\l its return forms to so provi<le (Rtip. 
iii(!'.), H. 10R);and t-ll!C'Cc>ssfnllysnstainedthisposition 
in l~JlR in \he .\Jew !'ark },liniil,'~ Company et al. eases 
~'il;J•·:t. ( ::. HU) TIJc· eourt in that opinion, however, 
no:ed tliat the taxpayers there had elcded to compute 
<1<'! ;l<'fion nndC't' the percE~ntagc method; and the hrief d 
the Connni:-:sion in those eases eons,antly reiterated that 
tl1e plaintii'l't-; ltad not sought permission to change to a 
mel llod other than Utah's pen~entag·e formula. In tl1is 
conneeiion, on :March 14, l!l-+4 the Commission had lvrit-
ten: 
"Please be advised that the Tax Commis-
sion has denied the request of the Utah l\Iining 
Congress for a change in the method of comput-
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ing depletion. The Commi::;sion feels that the 
law makes it rnandatory to deduct federal taxes 
before computing depletion. 
''However, the Cormnission would he very 
:,;ympathetic to a reqne:,;t fm a change from the 
percentage depletion method to the co8t method 
in determining depletion.'' 
(I<~x. ;) ; R. 227.) 
In the case now before the court Kennecott sought 
to make just such a change. (l<Jx. 3; R. 225.) But the 
effeet of the decision was to deny that request. No reason 
is assigned for this action, which plaintiff attacks as 
arbitrary, capricious and eontrary to law. 
This request. was in il!e nature of a third clloice or 
preference, since the taxpayer primarily requested and 
~;till suggests as the fairest and most practical method 
the use of the Federal percentage method, to be available 
of course to all mines. Mr. Earl described the history 
and advantages in detail of that method and recom-
mended that it be followed by the Commission. (R. 77) 
Hut the Commission apparently is of the opinion that 1\{r. 
garl's remarks and Kennecott's request in this respeet 
should be addressed to the legislature; i.e., in Utah, 
depletion under the law as it stands must be based upon 
one of only two alternatives. (H. 87) 
Thus, also, the point is here presented as to whether 
or not this restrictive construction is eorreet. If it is, 
the words "aceording to the peculiar conditions in each 
ease" are useless, as also is the standard of "a reason-
able allowance" applied to the facts of this case. 
18 
The defendant by itt:J decision redueed still further 
the proposed allowance of $6,4-35,813.78 an<l determined 
that the allowance for depletion in this case should be 
$G,089,G70.2G (Behedule 8, R. 27), the gross Utah Copper 
Division income for that year being $83,513,885.12. (Sche-
dule 11, R :n.) This figure is roughly GO per cent of the 
allowance computed under any of the following recog-
nizcfl nwtlwds for determining a "reasonable allow-
ance'': 
~o. 1-Federal value 111e tltod ____________ $12,-1-;)8, 1;;;,,;J7 
l\i o. 2-11'edera1 pereen tage metho<L$10,Gf"l0,822.tn 
Xo. :>-Utah value metho<L _____________ $1±,007,442.00 
No. -t- U tab pereen tage method 
(before Commission's 
('hanges in interpretation) .. $12,822,:~47.0~1 
(Utah as allowe<L. _______________ $G,08D,G70.2fi) 
(1 , •) 1)')~-) i~x. ->; -l. ~Dt). 
Tlte witne:-;s <;eo. C. I<~arl, plaintiff's Chief ]<jngineer, 
is " 'llml oi' e:~L(msive training· and practical experiene~'. 
He i~, iutimattd~- familiar with mining properties and 
p:lt'ti<·ularl~- the mine in question, and an expert in tlw 
field of llline valuation. (R G7, ct seq.) Neither his 
qualifieations no1· the engineering <leterminations of 
valnP (or for tIt at matter the pprcentage calenlations) are 
in dispute. I Ie expressed the opinion that any of the 
above four methods applied to the peculiar circumstances 
of this <'ase would afford a reasonable allowance for 
depletion within the permissive limits of administrative 
judgment (R 74); that a variation in the application or 
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• j ' • c J '. • ' J' • 1 ( 1' ~- ) J t l t ' \",,;:;; \\'ltil'11 ule l!l'llt:·; OJ ,jt1< p;HlCnt '· (;) ; Jl1 t mt lie 
~.c:,,.inutio;J ILl' (\oJ>ldion all(J\\'/HlC'<' t!J tl!P six million 
dollar liguru used hy the Couuni~:sion, or Jess than fifty 
per c<:mt, \Vas "wholly unn~asonahle" and har1 "ahso-
lntel:· no relationship" to dw actual operation::; and a 
fair allowance. ( K 7G.) 
Q. K ow, Thl r. Earl, do you recogmze that a 
Yariation between some of these methorls from 
rl\m Jl.lillion to Fourteen l\lillion is within the limi-
tation::; of judgment'? 'J'his is correct, isn't it? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. But with the diminution of that allowam·e 
to Six Jl.lillion or le8s than GO% is, in your OJ1inion, 
unn~asonable ~ 
A. ·wholly unreasonable. 
Q. And has no relationship to the fact of the 
actual operation out there as you know it to be~ 
A. It has absolutely no relationship. 
(Tr. 37-8.) 
Plaintiff's position accordingly is that this record 
shows an arbitrary and capricious attitude on the part 
of the Commission, resulting in denial to plaintiff of the 
rer1uired statutory deduction of a reasonable allowance 
for depletion. 'J'he commi8sion should have granted the 
request of Kennecott to compute the allowance either and 
preferably on the federal percentage basis, or on the 
Utah value-of-Jan nary 1, 1931 method under the circum-
;;tances. It is, we submit, evident that the Commission's 
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staff's ohjective was to apply mathematics and to inter-
pret the law to produce the lowest possible result in dol-
lars assignable to this deduction, rather than to allow a 
reasonable amount. (H. 92) 
(:\IH ALLISON): 
A. I don't fc•cl m a position to express an 
npmwll as to the reasonableness of this or any 
otlt<'i" d<~pletion allowance. In our detenuination 
we lmve attempt(•d to apply tlte statntor,\' n•ituin_~­
nwnts for tlw depletion allowance, and WP haven't, 
ac: 1\uditors, concpntcd onrselvcs with the n•a:.;on-
:<lllc•ness of the recmlt ohtaincd. 
A;-; will lw notPd from the rather brief record lH~rcin, 
tl1e ans1n•r to these charges is largely silence. Howe,,'er, 
tlten· <lid cc·r·m· staff attempts to justify their action in 
tit"~ it \\·a;-; :-dwwn tlmt i'rom 1!J:U tlmmgh l!Hl the Com-
mision Lad aliowe<l $;)2,240,744.01 in depletion (H. D-1) nn 
til<> ta:qJa)'er's own l!J:n ba::-;e of hut $11,-!1!J,;)40.00. ( IL 
g:;, ~::·>) Tlt(' lntt<>r \\·u;-; a hearsay figure at the time it 
\\n i'i1;-;t :~~;;,z(•d, e()nl'nsing CoHmtissioncr Hammond, 
wl::: ::aid (B. H-!): '"!low ('an you say that for one yc::r 
1 '::· :<i- J;lilliml <lollar eliarge for deplc~tion is unreasonable 
wlten that is more titan half the amount of the fair value 
() r tll<~ Tll'O J'C rty as reported b_v' the Company*** ? " 
:Jfr. Jj~arlreplied (H. 84-5): 
'l'he fif:,'1He to which you refer, l\fr. Hammond, 
I am not at all familiar with it. I do not know 
the basis upon which it was reported, or anything 
else, and I cannot answer that question, hut J do 
know this, that the basis set out in your statute 
is the fair market value of that mine as of that 
<late. r!'herc (that) would be hundreds of millions 
of do'llars, and that is what we are coneerned with 
on depletion, regardless of any other figures. 
Your statute says it shall he the fair market value 
of the property as of that date. Now, the rules for 
determining the fair market value of a mine have 
long been established. rl'hey have been recognized 
by the government, by purchasers of property, 
and people who have properties for sale. And the 
only thing about it, it is not subject to an exact 
determination beeause juilgment haf' to enter into 
the factors used. Now, 1 say l don't lmow what 
that figure (the hearsay figure) is; 1 don't knmv 
the basis for reporting it. Investment and market 
value as of a date have no relationship whatever. 
COl\f. HAl\Il\fOND: It just occured to me it 
was necessary to have some explanation of that 
great discrepancy in view of the fact that 1 think 
we generally agree that the purpose of allowing 
a deduction from a gross in arriving at the net 
income of a mine is to look for the return of 
capital, and that here, this report seems to have 
two figures; One of them E~leven Million Dollars 
plus as a fair value of the mine, and another fig-
ure, Eight Million Dollars plus as the book value 
of the mine. Now, those figures as I understand 
it haven't yet been presented here, and I don't 
know just how sound the basis is upon which 1 
am making that inquiry, but the figures seem to 
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be so far apart it seems to me you could make 
some explanation that would in some way justify 
your conclusions that the Six :Million Dollar figure 
\\~asn 't reasonable. 
The next day (reporter not present) it developed 
that the Ji!-';llrt' in dunht was based upon the net proceeds 
mine valuation for the depression year in question (I'Jx. 
G, Selwdule "H'', Items (1 and G, R 217); and thus, as 
stutcd h~' ;\Ir. B~arl, it \\"aS without re'lationship to the 
diiTNcnt statutory bm;i~; for depletion to be allowed for 
inc·ome tax purposes. 
Here~ we c·an only speculate as to what was the true 
basis t'or tlw decision in this case which without explana-
tion su:·dnined the dt~plction hut at a figure reduced even 
below tlmt lllade hefore the hearing. [t is appreciated 
keen!:., tlmt in this instance the latitude of the Commis-
sion i:-: extem.;ive, and that the lmrclen is upon Kennecott 
to l'<lnmwlc~ this court that the aetion taken was an almse 
ol' < li:;erdion .. ( 'ltic~ago & !\'. 'vV. H. Co. v. Commissioner 
(J I' ln ternal l~c'\'C'nllf', 114 i''. 2d 882. 
But not only is thP record bancn of anything 1Ilate-
rial and relcYant other than l\lr. Earl':,; undisputed testi-
mon:,, that the allowance was below the limits of judg-
ment; affirmatively it is slwwn that the amount allowed 
is only ahout 50% of what would he" reasonable" under 
both of the l<'ecleral methods here applicable, the Utah 
eost-or-valne metho(l and the Utah percentage method 
as previously construed. 
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l<'urthcr, un pxmu!n.J.! ;(,11 or the statute~: ~~nd lw•t::ods 
ol' other states reveals support l'or Kennecott's position. 
For exDJ~lpl<", 111(; following ;,tatcs direeU~, iil: their de-
lltction ('Ollljmtation to the optional federal methods: 
California-Sec. 8,!.;·, Bank & Corporation, Act of 
lD45 
Connecticut-See. 4l!Je, Supp., Conn. Gen. Sta-
tutes 1!J:j0 
Idaho-Sec. Gl-21-07 ( c-1), Idaho Code Ann. 1~):12 
1\Tontana-Scc. 22!37 (Third), l\lont. Hcv. Statutes 
1 !):35 
Oklahoma-Sec. 880 (g), 68 Okla. Statutes 1941 
Oregon-Sec. 110-1308 (g), Oregon Comp. Laws 
Ann. 
Yermont-Sec. 8DO, Yennont Public Laws l!J:i3 
Three states havo accomplished the same result, since 
in Tennessee, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island the entire 
law is based upon the federal tax. And the following tie 
in to the federal method by regulation: 
Georgia-Sec. 92-:U09, Georgia Code 1!)33 
Kansas-Sec. nJ-3206 (11) Gen. Stat. Kans. 1953, 
Heg. 54 
Louisiana-Sec. 8587.9 (m) La. Gen. Stat. 1939, 
Heg. 96 
1\faryland-Sec. 224(j-l) Ann. Code 1939, Reg. 4 
Five additional states have delegated plenary regu-
latory powers to the administering agencies: Arizona, 
!IT innesota, Missouri, New l\J exico and North Carolina. 
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gight appear to tie depletion into cost-or-value alone; 
two apparently do not recognize the depletion deduction; 
and the remaining eighteen do not appear to have a com-
parable tax. 
Thus, we submit, we find support in the policies and 
pmetices of other states to a most ::-;ubstantia'J degree 
that: 
a. 'l'lle Utah Cmmnission has failed to fol-
lovv the legis] a tive mandate to allow rea~:onable 
depletion in this eat:ie. 
b. 'l'he Utah statutet:i intend to delegate to 
the Cormnission wide latitnde hy regnlation ap-
plicable to all, to invoke any t:;ound method where-
by to coll!pnte that rea::;onable alJowanee. '!'he 
Connnission it:i not harm.;trung between an unrea-
sonable percentage formula, and a difficult ~'ingle 
alternative. 
e. '11he method--federal percentage~~-is re~:­
sonable, pradieal, simple, /'air and recognized as 
snnnd. 
d. ln an.r event, 1\ennecott sJwn'ld be af-
forded the alternative of utili~ing the Utah eost-
or-Ya1ne method of .January 1, l~):n. 
Vh~nh\t s\lggest\-', Umt \-',U\l:;ection\'0 8 aml ~) ot S,ee. 
80-1:1-8 are amhiguous an<l vnn\'l1eting. i1~ither alone 
wonld present a clear Jegi::-;lative policy. 'l'ogcther, the 
Commission's view would nullify subsection 8 leaving 9 
alone. Plant iff'';-; I' 1c \\' would g·ive heed to the rule of 
eon::trnction ''in pari materia'' (:iO Am .• Tur. :J42 et 
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seq., Norville v. State 'j'ax Commission, ~)8 U. ] 70, !J7 P. 
2d !);~7.) and find the legislative intent to he to give effect 
io both. That is, tl1e key criterion is a" reasonable allow-
mwe'' under :mbsection 8; hut two possible methods are 
then authorized as aids by :mhsection !J, without restrict-
ing the determination of tlw allowance to onl)" those 
methods and thus preventing the Commission from utili-
zing modern improvements in computation. Either that 
was the legislative intent, or there has been set up a 
peculiar statute with less 'latitude than in 'practically 
every other state which has considered the problem; and 
as noted, subsection 8 might just as well have been 
omitted. 
3. The Commission has misinterpr,eted the Utah stat-
utes establishing tbe percentage formula for determining 
depletion. 
Assuming for the purpose of art,rument that the de-
fendant Commission acted within its prerogatives in 
denying plaintiff's request to change over to either the 
Utah value method or the federal percentage method; 
that is, that plaintiff is forced to remain within the per-
centage method straight jacket to which it submitted 
under administrative representations which turned out 
to he illusory. (R. 62) 
We concede that under the New Park decision supra 
federal taxes must first he deducted in determining de-
pletion when this method is invoked. But, plaintiff sub-
mits that in making an allocation of the income from the 
property to variou:-.; steps such as "mining," the Com-
mission has misconstrued and therefore has violated the 
law. 
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'T'he percentage method :::;tatute provides that the 
all<xwance for depletion :,;hall be one-third of the net in-
coute ''from the property.'' Plaintiff contends that all of 
its in eo me from Utah Copper Division is from the prop-
Prty; namely, the Bingham Canyon mine. 
'l'ltis conrt nott~d at the encl o£ the 1\ew Park decision 
that when ·~ S0-1 :1-R (%) qnalifiecl the words "net in-
come" with tile \\·o nls "from the property," t!te legis-
latin~ pnrposP >vm: to prevent a wasting assets corpora-
tion frm1t taking a dednction for depletion "from all 
in<'oJJt<', !'rom whatever ;-;onre<' derived." It will h(~ noted 
here tltat Seltedn]p:-; 7 and 12 properly excluded from the 
ha:-;e to whi<'lt tlw pereentage was applie(l all income other 
I l1an front I he !JiJI(j/wm ( 'anyon mine. 
a. In tlw first pl:we, the Commission's eon ten! ion 
Js llN<' din~dl~· in the teeth of it:::; own admini:::;trative 
interprdat.ion of the Ad from 1!)i31 to date. Il has never 
lwreiPfore attempted to apply this novel accounting in-
n·ntion either as to Kenm~cott or any other Utah m.inc. 
( R 1 0()) 
_\s uoted o11 page fi oi' tlte Agreed Record, the Com-
llli;·:-:ion':-: instructions \vith respeet to <lepletion were not 
atuewled in thiti re:-;pect until 194:~, which for the first 
time hrought into the picture the requirement of alloea-
ting- income to sources other than "mineral extraction." 
( Lt 107) 
b. B'urther, the federal :::;tatute which was originally 
the wodel for Utah':-; provisions, even as amended to de-
fine and <lelilllit "from tlH~ property," has not heen eon-
~tnw<l to rertnire snch an alloeation. \Vith respeet to the 
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spr'cifie Kennecott properties here involved the federal 
eonnte~·part Ju:ts been given the same construction hereto-
fore ~lpplied hy the Utah Commission from l!)lG to date. 
(~Jr. l 1~arl's testimony, R. 68-70.) 
c. Finally, the accounting invention ( rj:x. 4, R. 226) 
is an admitted]~- self-proving formula. (R. ~H,70) 
The formula reads as fol'lows: 
D2 + D (2'[1C + TNl)- rl'NI. J\IC = 0 
--------- ----
3 3 
which its inventor, Mr. Allison, on page 91 of the record 
said was a quadratic e<1uation which determined deple-
tion by the particular formula "because the depletion 
itself allowable under the statute depends upon the 
amount of depletion allowable." Mr. J!Jar'l pointed out 
that ''I was taught very early in my mathematics that a 
formula which defined anything in terms of itself should 
not he n.-;ed. Now, this formula does that very thing*"~'." 
(H. 70) 
• • • • 
lt is respectfully submitted that here again is an 
illustration where the Commission is arrogating unto 
itself the power arbitrarily to create and apply mathema-
tical formulae to the sole end that in the particular case 
a higher tax results. Only the Commission's accountants 
could conceive that when the legislature in plain words 
allowed depletion for the average mine operator, self-
proving quadratic equations were contemplated. 
In considering the words ''gross income from the 
property" as used in the Federal statute, the United 
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States Supreme Court has said that "the term should 
be taken in its natural sense.'' Further: '' U ross income 
from time to time may be more or less than market value 
according to the bearing of particular contracts. We do 
not tl1ink that we are at libc.rty to construct a theoretical 
gross 1ncmne by recourse to the c:tpense of production 
operations." 
Tielvering v .. Mountain Prodneers Corp., :;o:l (T. H. 
27G, 82 L. ed. D07, 38 S. Ct. G2:l. 
So l!Pre the plain and natural meaning seems to 
trent a;; the "net ineome from the property" the amonnt 
rceeivud from the sales of copper--the taxpayer's first 
marketable prodnet whieh came from the Utah Copper· 
l\l ine. This is 1vhat has been aecepted without <Itwstion 
h;.· hoth :-:.tate a11<l federal taxing agents until the pre::e:1t 
attempt. Thi:-; is what the legislature of Utah must have 
int<'1Hl('d \YIH•n it enacted the corporation franchise tax 
in 19:31 a:-; applied to mining operations well known to 
exist !:Pre for nearl.v a rentnry. Certainly if the legisla-
t1Fc• lwd int0ndecl to ~uhstitute a theoretical meonw lly 
Li1c• ":lu:~tor, it \';ould have :"aid so. 
'1'he qtw:-;tion may well be~ a~ked at what point should 
the e11t-of'f he ma<le in ease:-; sueh as Kennecott where 
conec~ivahl~' expansion eonld eontinue into fabrication, 
and po:-;si1Jl;.' even hranel1 enterprisC's for the aetual ntili-
J~ation o!' the product such a~ l'or eopper roofs in homes. 
'J.'hese indeed might entail i11COJIIC from aetivities other 
than "mining" in its "natural sense." \Ve would sub-
mit that the natnral <·ut-orf point slwnl<l he at the end 
of the first nnrmally JJwrkefa{Jle product; and indeed 
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this it-> the ruh~ of Seetion 114 of the [''ederal Internal 
Hevenue Code, where by statute Congress mnende<l the 
old law comparahle to Utah's now to define "grot->s in-
come from the property" as follows: 
AR used in thi;-; paragraph the term ''gross 
income from the JH'O}Jert.y'' means the gross in-
come from mining. 'l'l1e term "mining" as used 
herein shall he considered to inelude not merely 
the extraction of the ores or minerals from the 
r;round but also the ordinary treatment processes 
normally applied by mine owners or operators in 
order to obtain the comerciall~' marketable unn-
eral product or products. 
Here as noted, the commercia'lly marketable mineral 
products of Kennecott are sold when fin;t possible in the 
normal course of operation-the copper after it is finall:v 
produced in marketable form by refining. (H. 1 02) 
[''urther, the only Commis:-;ion rule on this subject 
-in contrast with Federal Statute-is the 194:1 clmnge in 
Instruction 21 to read: 
In case;.; where the taxpayer engaged in ac-
tivitieR in addition to, or derives income from 
;;;ources other than, mineral extraction, deductions 
not directly attributable to any particular activity 
or source of income shall he fairly allocated. 
AR stipulated and undisputed, such profits or income 
attri'hutable to ::;melting, transpo1·tation, refining an<l 
selling the first marketable product have alread.v been 
exc'lu<led by payments to the several compani<~s perform-
ing those services. (It. 66-70, 102.) 'J'J1is practice has 
(~ontiune<l since long before Utah had an income tax, but 
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no one until this ease had doubted that Kennecott's in-
come from its sales of copper and other mineral products 
·when finally sold in marketable form was income from 
its Utah Copper niine. 
In conelwling the argument with respect to the de-
pletion allowan<'e, W(~ summarize: 
'rJ~e Cmm1Ji1-;sion has violated the statutory mandate 
whieh requires the allowanec or a reasonalJle dednetion 
for depletion under the facts of Kennecott's particular 
operaLions, because: 
Firs!: a. The Counuission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in sllllllllarily refusing Kennecott's request 
to depart rrolll the state percentage method formula 
wllieh it had originally accepted on the basis of t\vo in-
terpretation::; no longer existent; the first, the Colllmis-
sion's attempted rhange of the ::-;tatute to hase the per-
<'enbge allowance on income from "mineral extradion" 
ralltn !"rom tht> wording "from the property"; and Uw 
se<·,;;J(l, tlie lilliJl"<'<'edented federal taxes which under this 
court's int<~rpretation wust first he deducted before com-
putin;.;· depletion. 
b. Tl1e ( 'onnnil::lsion tihouJd have granted plaintiff'N 
request under these ei renmstanees to transfer eithPr to 
tlw (;tal! eosi-or-value mctl10d; or preferably to the 
federal percentage method for computing depletion, or 
at least some other method which would have afforded 
a n~asonhlf~ allowmH·e under the circumstanees of this 
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/)'ccond: In any ev-ent, the Commission has acted 
arldrar1l;.", caprieiow.;ly and l)eyond its authority by mis-
e J;;::i ruing the lU\\' to permit allocating a portion of Ken-
m·(~ott's net income from its Utah mining property to 
other processes on the basis of a self-proving formula. 
4. The Tax Commission erred in that it has discrim-
inated against this taxpayer and is attempting to take its 
property withuut due process of law in v~olation of the 
:Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, and 
Sections 7 and 24, Article I, of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah. 
rl'his point is directed to the action taken by the 
Commission outlined heretofore insofar as such action 
violates plaintiff's constitutional rights. Plaintiff with 
all others is to he afforded the equal protection of Utah's 
laws without discrimination and in accordance with those 
laws, under the \Yell-known provisions of the state and 
federal Constitutions above set forth. 
a. But here, of all corporations engaged in business 
in several states including Utah, Kennecott is to be sad-
dled with the Commission's specia'l rules for allocating 
income to this state for tax purposes. The record is silent 
as to the basis for such special treatment unless it is that 
the tax burden will be greater to the taxpayer. 
b. And too, plaintiff alone is to he given the benefit 
of 1<:xhibit 4-the self-proving qna<lratic equation-even 
though the result, as Inventor Allison candi(lly admitted, 
may or may not have any relationship to a "reasonable" 
allowance for depletion. (R. 92) No attempt-at least as 
of this date-has been made hy the defendant to allocate 
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for depletion purposes any other mine's income ''from 
the property" to such post-mine processes. ( R. lOG) 
5. The Tax Commission erred in including in the tax 
base subsidies paid to plaintiff by the Federal Government. 
During nJ42 tlw I•'ederal Governuwnt pai<l to KennC'-
<·ott ~:>tipulated ~mil::; in c·ounedion witl1 its Utah opera-
hom; a~ ~nb::;idie~ under the authority of .iO U. S. C. A . 
. \ p p. !l01 -2. 'I' he ( ~m umi~sion Ita~ i neluded t ll<~~P amo llll ts 
H:-' pad of Kennecott'::; ''gro~::; income" for Utah Corp-
onltion i"ranehi::;e Tax purpm;<•s. (R 112; StiJJ. par. VI.) 
Plain ti f'f' concedes that Utah'~:> eo rpo ration fralle h i~e 
tax ~tatute:s are broad Pnough to indude ~ueh sub~idie~ 
a~ "gros~ income,'' in contrast with the more lituited 
provi~iom; of' other Utah 'J'ax statutes. 
Overm1ing the United State::; Disb·id C'onrt, tlH~ 
Tenth Cireuit Court of A~ppeals ha8 held that the l1'ederal 
Oovernment di<l not intend to exelude the8e wb8irlie~ 
front this type of state taxation. ( Kenneeott Copper 
( 'ornoration et al. v. Sa'lt Lake County, 1();~ 1•'. 2d -lN·L) 
Adtuittedly it will theref'on~ he difficult for this court to 
do anything· other than to follow the Circuit Court. 'rhus 
\\·l!ile plaintiff ~:>ubmits the opinion of the Circuit Court 
i;:-; erroneous, extended argument now, except to preserve 
the point, would ~:>eem to serve no useful purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, § 80-B-47 provides that there ~:>hall be 
a plenary review by this court of the Commission's 
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action~ ba~ed upon the record below, in effect as wou'ld be 
in an equity case. 
A judgt~ irying such a cau~e 'vould uf course llaYe to 
make finclings supported by eompetent evidence. ( § 104-
26-2, 3) No jury would be permitted to ignore or disre-
gard without cause competent and material evidence; 
(Leavitt v. 'Thurston, :-3:-3 U. 1:-35, 143 P. 140; Karren v. 
Hair, U. :3~)4, 225 P. 1094); and the action of administra-
tive tribunals must be consistent with, and even discre-
tion must be exercised "in accordance with established 
principles of justice and not arbitrarily or capriciously, 
fraudulently, and without factual basis.'' ( -1-2 Am .• J m. 
:~80, Sec. 69.) 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that based on the rec-
onl below and in accordance with these principles, the de-
cision of the defendant State Tax 8ommission should be 
set aside and the cause remanded with the following 
directions : 
1. That plaintiff's amended return, filed in accord-
ance with § 80-13-21, should be treated as the basis for 
computing the corporation franchise tax subject of course 
to the usual administrative review of its contents. 
2. That there should be excluded from gross income 
the federal subsidies paid to Kennecott. 
3. That in computing the required reasonable al-
lmvance for depletion: 
a. The Commission unuer Utah's law may g1ve 
consideration to the advisability of permitting plaintiff 
and all other mine operators to invoke the federal per-
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centage method for determining a ''reasonable allow-
ance,'' subject to the Commission's rules and regulations. 
h. In the alternative, the plaintiff he afforded an 
election between the Utah percentage method ( § 80-13-
8 ( !lb) ) as construed by this court in New Park Mining 
Co. E~t al v. State Tax Commission, and the cost-or-value 
method of) 80-1~~-8 (9a). 
e. That the Utah percentage method as applied to 
both Kennecott and other mine operators is to he con-
strued to reqnire as ''net income from the property" the 
in('lusion of 1l1E~ net amounts actually received from the 
0 pe I' a~ 0 r f I" OJ ll the sale of the mine products in their 
first normalJ.v nmrketable form, excluding income from 
sources o!her than those <·onneeted in the full and natnral 
sfmse with the mining venture. 
nespeetfu ll.v :mhmi tte<l, 
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